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THE CONTRACT EXCEPTION TO THE UNIFORM TRADE
SECRETS ACT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
FEDERAL DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT
Richard F. Dole, Jr.†
The state statutory remedies for trade secret misappropriation
and the new federal statutory remedies in the 2016 federal Defend
Trade Secrets Act must be coordinated with both each other and with
state enforcement of restrictive employment covenants. Whenever both
statutory and contractual remedies are sought, a double monetary
recovery for a single wrong must be avoided. A statutory remedy
should not prohibit conduct that state restrictive employment covenant
policy does not allow to be restricted. The fact that state restrictive
covenant policy can protect confidential information that does not
qualify for trade secret protection also must not be allowed to erode
the statutory definition of trade secret.

† Richard F. Dole is the B.W. Young Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center.
He is a commercial law expert and a scholar of bankruptcy, consumer protection, and creditors’
rights and debtors’ protections. He has written a treatise on Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code and has been a consultant on Bankruptcy Revision for the United States Senate Judiciary
Committee.
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INTRODUCTION
The state-enacted Uniform Trade Secrets Act1 (“UTSA”)
reformulates the elements of the tort of trade secret misappropriation
and preempts conflicting duplicative noncontractual remedies in an
enacting state.2 The UTSA was initially adopted in 1979 and amended
in 19853 by the Uniform Law Commission (the “ULC”).4 The ULC
reports the UTSA as having been enacted in forty-seven states.5
Section 7 of the widely-adopted 1985 version of the UTSA
expressly excepts from preemption “contractual remedies, whether or
not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret.”6 An Official
Comment to both the 1985 and 1979 versions of UTSA Section 7(b)
states that the Contract Exception is limited to express and implied-infact contracts.7 Like the UTSA, the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act
(the “DTSA”) reformulates the elements of the tort of trade secret

1. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12, 14 U.L.A. 529-659 (2005), 92-146 (2017
Supp.). Decisions under state enactments of the UTSA are identified in the footnotes.
2. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(a); see generally Richard F. Dole, Jr., Preemption of
Other State Law by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 17 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 95 (2014)
[hereinafter Preemption].
3. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12.
4. See id. (The ULC was organized in 1892 to promote desirable and practicable
uniformity in state law. Commissioners are appointed by every state, the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico).
5. See UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Legislative Fact Sheet – Trade Secrets Act,
http://bit.do/ULC_Legislative (the UTSA has yet to be enacted in Massachusetts, New York, and
North Carolina but has been adopted in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands). Widespread enactment of the UTSA has been a factor in the increasing importance of
trade secret law. David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly
Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1106 (2012) (“Reason No. 4: The UTSA . . .
widespread enactment of the UTSA has increased awareness of trade secret law[.]”).
6. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b)(1). Most states have enacted either § 7(b) of the
1985 Act or a nonuniform variation. The only states with § 7(b) of the 1979 Act are Alaska,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Louisiana, and Washington. See A LASKA STAT. § 45.50.930 (2016), ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-75-602 (2011 & 2017 Supp.), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-57(b) (2015 & 2016
Supp.), LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1437 (West 2012 & 2017 Supp.), and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
19.108.900 (West 2013 & 2017 Supp.).
7. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b). On the other hand, quasi-contract, unjust
enrichment, and quantum meruit claims for trade secret misappropriation are preempted. See, e.g.,
Spitz v. Proven Winners North America, LLC, 759 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[U]njust
enrichment and quantum meruit are essentially claims for restitution” [and preempted by the
UTSA.]) (Illinois enactment); see also Fox Controls, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., No. 02 C 346, 2004
WL 906114, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2004) (“We reject plaintiff’s wholly unsupported
assertion that quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit are ‘contractual remedies’
and thus are not affected by ITSA preemption.”) (Illinois enactment).
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misappropriation,8 but the DTSA has no express counterpart of the
UTSA Contract Exception.9
The UTSA Contract Exception reflects the close relationship
between the tort of trade secret misappropriation and restrictive
covenants.10 An Official Comment to both the 1985 and 1979 versions
of the UTSA gives covenants not to disclose trade secrets and
covenants not to compete, which are intended to protect trade secrets
as examples of contracts that are not preempted.11 These covenants
exist in two principal contexts: they are required by persons with trade
secret rights from employees with access to trade secrets and
confidential information and from business associates with access to
trade secrets and confidential information, e.g., licensees, customers,
joint ventures, distributors, and suppliers.12
The two principal contexts in which restrictive covenants are
required involve many of the same considerations. However, with
respect to employees, the extent to which an individual’s ability to find
appropriate work is limited is an important factor in determining
enforceability; whereas, with respect to business associates, the extent
to which a business’ ability to compete is limited is an important factor
in determining enforceability.

8. Defend Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. No. 114-153, §§ 1-7, 130 Stat. 376-86 (2016); 18
U.S.C. §§ 1836-1839 (amended 2016).
9. See Defend Trade Secrets Act §§ 1836-1839.
10. Former employers, for example, frequently sue former employees for both breach of a
restrictive employment covenant and trade secret misappropriation. See, e.g., La Calhene, Inc. v.
Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 523, 524, 531-32 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (preliminary injunction granted for
both breach of restrictive covenant & trade secret misappropriation) (Minnesota enactment);
Mattern & Assoc. v. Seidel, 678 F. Supp. 2d 256, 267-70 (D. Del. 2010) (recovery for both breach
of restrictive covenant & trade secret misappropriation) (Delaware enactment); Xantrex Tech.,
Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., No. 07-CV-02324-WYD-MEH, 2008 WL 2185882, at *16, *20
(D. Colo. May 23, 2008) (preliminary injunction granted for both breach of restrictive covenant
& trade secret misappropriation) (Colorado enactment); Engility Corp. v. Daniels, No. 16-CV2473, 2016 WL 7034976, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 2, 2016) (alleged violation of the DTSA, the
Colorado enactment of the UTSA, and breach of a confidentiality covenant) (Colorado
enactment).
11. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7.
12. See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in
Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 293, 303 (2010) [hereinafter Statistical Analysis Federal
Courts] (“[I]n over 85% of cases, the alleged misappropriator was either an employee or business
partner.”). This article presents statistics from 394 cases in which a federal district court issued
written opinions based on trade secret law between 1950 and 2008. David S. Almeling et al., A
Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57 (2011)
[hereinafter Statistical Analysis State Courts], is a companion article, which analyzed 2,077 state
appellate court decisions issued between 1995 and 2009, that reached a similar conclusion.
Employees and business associates of persons with trade secret rights frequently are required to
execute restrictive covenants. Id. at 58, 68-69.
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This Article deals with the relationship of restrictive employment
covenants to the UTSA and the DTSA. The starting place is an
overview of the UTSA and the law of restrictive employment
covenants.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE USTA

The UTSA is an intellectual property statute that encourages the
development of valuable new commercial information through
recognition of limited exclusive rights.13 The UTSA was intended to
fill the gap created by the omission of trade secrets from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.14 In 1995, the American Law Institute
(ALI) promulgated the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,15
which reintroduced ALI coverage of trade secrets,16 and, as a general
proposition, is intended to be consistent with the UTSA.17
UTSA Section 1(4) defines a “trade secret” as follows:
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
process that:
(i)
derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and
(ii)
is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.18
The definition has three aspects. The preamble is a nonexclusive
list of the forms in which a trade secret can appear. Because the list is
nonexclusive, it does not limit the information that can be a trade
secret.19
13. See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008); but see Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrets as Property:
Theory and Consequences, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 80-84 (2007) (trade secrets are best justified
by the infrastructural nexus that a business provides for creativity).
14. See 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at 1-2 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (stating that
trade secret law had become independent of tort law); The Restatement (First) of Torts devoted
three sections with elaborate comments to trade secrets, see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
§§757-759 & comments (A M. LAW INST. 1939).
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
16. RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45.
17. See RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39.
18. See RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39; see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
§ 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 529, 538 (2005). The definition was not amended in 1985.
19. See American Paper & Packaging Prods., Inc., v. Kirgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 132324, 228 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (“We cannot agree with respondents’
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Subsection (i) requires that a trade secret derive “actual or
potential” “independent economic value” from not being “generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use.”20 “Independent value derived from secrecy” can be shown by
proof of both actual or potential value and secrecy.21
Subsection (ii) requires that a trade secret be the subject of efforts
that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.22
This aspect of the definition primarily23 deals with whether a particular
plaintiff has standing to maintain an action for trade secret
misappropriation.
The UTSA definition of “misappropriation”24 requires proof of a
“trade secret” for misappropriation to be possible.25 Actual or
threatened misappropriation must exist for a remedy to be available
under the UTSA.26
A. The UTSA Preemption Provision
The 1979 version of UTSA Section 7(a), which preempts an
enacting state’s conflicting duplicative tort, restitutionary, and other
law creating civil liability for misappropriation of a trade secret, was

argument that the Legislature’s failure to include customer lists in its definition of trade secrets
represents an intentional exclusion of same. The very language of Civil Code section 3426.1,
subdivision (d), is inclusive, not exclusive.”) (California enactment).
20. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i).
21. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn.
1983) (“[T]he [trial] court cited the time and money ECC reasonably expended in developing its
motors. That ECC expended time and money between 1966 and 1975 in the development of the
1125 motor and its predecessors does not support a finding of competitive advantage unless, under
the present state of the art, a prospective competitor could not produce a comparable motor
without a similar expenditure of time and money. The trial court found . . . that such time and
money would be required of a prospective competitor today . . . . The EEC 1125, therefore did
provide ECC with economic value from its secrecy[.]”), aff’d following remand on other grounds,
370 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (Minnesota enactment).
22. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii).
23. Proof of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy also is evidence that information is
secret. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757 cmt. b-759 & cmts. (A M. LAW INST. 1939)
(The factors to be considered in determining whether a trade secret exists include “the extent of
the measures taken…to guard the secrecy of the information.”).
24. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2).
25. Id. § 1(2)(i) (“‘Misappropriation’ means (i) acquisition of a trade secret of another.”).
26. Id. §§ 2-3 (Misappropriation must exist for damages to be recoverable, and actual or
threatened misappropriation must exist for injunctive relief to be available). Electro-Craft Corp.,
332 N.W.2d at 897 (“[W]ithout . . . finding a trade secret, we cannot grant relief to ECC.”)
(Minnesota enactment). A defendant can be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees if a plaintiff has
claimed in bad faith that either threatened or actual misappropriation existed, see UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 4(i).
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amended in 1985.27 The 1985 changes were not substantive.28 Section
7(a) of the 1985 Act provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b), this [Act] displaces
conflicting tort restitutionary, and other law of this State
providing remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.29
A conflict of authority exists as to whether Section 7(a) preempts
an enacting state’s civil remedies for misappropriation of information
that does not satisfy the UTSA definition of trade secret.30 Under the
majority and better view, preemption exists.31
B. The Contract Exception to the UTSA Preemption Provision
The Section 7(b) exceptions from preemption were clarified by
the 1985 amendments. The 1979 Act stated:
This [Act] does not affect:
(1) contractual or other civil liability or relief that is not based
upon misappropriation of a trade secret; or
(2) criminal liability for misappropriation of a trade secret.32
The amended 1985 Act provides:
This [Act] does not affect:
(1) contractual remedies, whether or not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret;
(2) other civil remedies that are not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret; or
(3) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret.33
The 1985 Section 7(b)(1) Contract Exception may appear broader
than the 1979 Act in excepting contract claims that are based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret. In Imaginative Research Associates

27. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(a) (1985 additions underlined; 1985 deletions struck
through).
28. Compare id. § 7(a) (“This [Act] displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law
of this State pertaining to civil liability for misappropriation of a trade secret.”) with the 1985
version in the text infra note 29.
29. Id. § 7(a).
30. Compare Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 793-94 (Wis.
2006) (no preemption) (Wisconsin enactment), with Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 904
A.2d 652, 666-67 (N.H. 2006) (preemption of civil remedies for misappropriation of information
that does not qualify as a UTSA trade secret) (New Hampshire enactment).
31. See generally Dole, Preemption, supra note 2.
32. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b)(2).
33. Id. § 7(b)(3).
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v. Ramirez,34 a federal district judge, however, reasonably concluded
that the Connecticut enactment of the 1979 statute was equally broad.
A plaintiff’s contract claims are not preempted even if “those claims
are premised on Defendant’s alleged misappropriation of trade
secrets.”35 In reaching this conclusion, the federal district judge
considered court decisions under enactments of the UTSA in other
states,36 which were relevant in Connecticut due to its adoption of the
UTSA Section 8 Uniformity Clause providing:
This [Act] shall be applied and construed to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the
subject of this [Act] among states enacting it.37
Alabama, Iowa, Nebraska, and New Mexico have omitted both
Section 7 and the UTSA Uniformity Clause.38 Nevertheless, depending
upon the reasons for omitting these provisions, the general adoption of
the UTSA by these four states should make well-reasoned decisions in
other states under Section 7 persuasive. Nebraska, for example, omitted
Section 7 because, at the time of enactment, there were no Nebraska
statutes or cases in conflict with the UTSA.39
Primarily in New York and California, James Pooley has noted
case-law recognition of a breach of confidence theory of trade secret
protection.40 Whether the claim sounds in tort, contract implied in law,

34. Imaginative Research Associates, Inc. v. Ramirez, 718 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D. Conn.
2010) (Connecticut enactment); accord 3A Composites USA, Inc. v. United Indus., No. 5:14-CV5147, 2015 WL 5437119, at *6 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 15, 2015) (“This Court is persuaded, for the
same reasons given in Ramirez, that ‘it is clear that [the ATSA] does not preempt…contract
claims, regardless…whether those claims are premised on Defendants’ alleged misappropriation
of trade secrets.”), motion for reconsideration denied, 2015 WL 11120888 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 4,
2015) (Arkansas enactment).
35. Ramirez, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 250. Section 7(b)(1) of the 1979 Act leaves open whether
the qualification “not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret” applies to the Contract
Exception in addition to “other civil liability or relief.” See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b)(1).
36. Ramirez, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 249-50.
37. See id. at 249; see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8. The Uniformity Clause was
not amended in 1985. See id. The Connecticut enactment merely substituted “this chapter” for
“this Act” in the Uniformity Clause. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-58 (2018 Supp.).
38. See ALA. CODE §§8-27-1 to 8-27-6 (1975), IOWA CODE §§550.1-550.8 (West 2018),
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-501 to 87-507 (West. 2018), N.M. STAT. ANN. §§57-3A-1 to 57-3A-7
(1989).
39. See Gerald B. Buechler, Jr., Revealing Nebraska’s Trade Secret Act, 23 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 323, 328-29 & n.31 (1989) (stating that the absence of existing Nebraska cases and statutes
made §7 “simply unnecessary” in Nebraska); but see 205 Corp. v. Brandow, 517 N.W.2d 548,
551-52 (Iowa 1994) (“Before adopting the uniform trade secrets Act, the legislature considered
and chose to omit section 7 of the uniform act, which would have specifically displaced all other
trade secret recoveries. We think it is clear that the omission was deliberate . . . . Chapter 550 has
not preempted all tort theories involving trade secrets.”) (Iowa enactment).
40. JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 3.04[4], at 3-44 (Rel. 36, 2016).
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or contract implied in fact is not clear.41 To the extent that the breach
of confidence theory of trade secret protection is based upon an express
or an implied-in-fact contract, cases recognizing this theory are within
the Contract Exception.42
C. Necessary Exclusions from the Contract Exception
Almost all restrictive employment covenants that are enforceable
in an enacting state are protected from preemption by the Contract
Exception. However, one type of contract is subject to preemption—a
contract defining either a protectable UTSA “trade secret” or
actionable UTSA “misappropriation” differently than the statute.43 If
this limitation is not recognized, the Contract Exception could destroy
the uniformity that the UTSA was created to provide in derogation of
the UTSA Section 8 Uniformity Clause.44 Connecticut, for example,
has a nonuniform amendment to 1979 Section 7(a) that could be read
to allow parties to agree that UTSA Section 7(a) preemption will not
take place. 45 But Connecticut’s enactment of the Section 8 Uniformity
41. Id.
42. Many breach of confidence theory cases involve liability imposed by law rather than
voluntarily assumed liability. See, e.g., Kamin v. Kuhnau, 374 P.2d 912 (1962), in which the
Court approved the following statement in a prior case:
[T]he defendants took unwarranted advantage of the confidence which the
Schreyers reposed in them and obtained the desired knowledge without the
expenditure of money, effort and ingenuity which the experimental analysis of the
model on the market would have required. Such an advantage obtained through
breach of confidence is morally reprehensible and a proper subject for legal
redress.
(quoting A. O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1934)).
43. See, e.g., Millet v. Crump, 687 So. 2d 132, 135-36 (La. App. 1996) (“[A]lthough the
parties referred to the accounts sold by Crump as confidential and trade secrets, the testimony at
trial establishes these were not confidential.”) (Louisiana enactment); see also Sun Media Sys.,
Inc. v. KDSM, LLC, 564 F. Supp. 2d 946, 965 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (“Plaintiff cannot . . . use the
confidentiality clause in the KDSM contract to turn items into trade secrets that simply are not
trade secrets under applicable law.”), reconsideration denied on other grounds, 576 F. Supp. 2d
1018 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (Iowa enactment). The notion that the parties can create a trade secret by
contract also has been rejected at common law. See Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc.,
166 F. Supp. 250, 265 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (dictum), aff’d per curiam, 283 F. 2d 695 (1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961) (“[M]atters which are generally known in the trade or readily
discernible by those in the trade cannot be made secret by being so labeled in an agreement.”);
see also Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic Sci. Corp., 400 N.E.2d 1274, 1288 (Mass. Ct. App.
1980) (“[A]n agreement cannot make secret that which is not secret, and it remains for the court
to determine whether an alleged trade secret is in fact such . . . Indeed, a non-disclosure agreement
which seeks to restrict the employee’s right to use an alleged trade secret which is not such in fact
or law is unenforceable as against public policy.”) (citation omitted).
44. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8, 14 U.L.A. 529, 656 (2005). The UTSA Prefatory
Note, for example, states in part, “The contribution of the Uniform Act is . . . unitary definitions
of trade secret and trade secret misappropriation[.]” Id. at 531.
45. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-37(a) (“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the
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Clause46 requires reading the nonuniform amendment to refer to the
Contract Exception.47
D. The Tort Consequences of the Contract Exception
If an otherwise enforceable restrictive employment covenant falls
within the Contract Exception, a tort action for intentional interference
with that restrictive covenant is also shielded from preemption by the
Exception.48 Hauck Manufacturing Co. v. Astec Industries,49 which
rejects this approach,50 does not even discuss the Contract Exception.
The Hauck Manufacturing Court based its preemption analysis upon
the UTSA’s providing that misappropriation includes “breach or
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy.”51 However, a
contrary Seventh Circuit opinion states:
[t]he tort of inducing breach of a non-disclosure contract (the
sort of contract independently protected by paragraph (b)(1)
[the Contact Exception] is “not based upon misappropriation
of a trade secret.” It is based upon interference with the
[protected] contract.52
In sum, the Contract Exception includes tort actions for interfering
with excepted contracts.

provisions of this chapter supersede any conflicting tort, restitutionary, or other law of this state
pertaining to civil liability for misappropriation of a trade secret.”).
46. Id. § 35-58.
47. Id. § 35-57(b)(1) (“This chapter does not affect: (1) Contractual or other civil liability
or relief that is not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret[.]”). For judicial interpretation
of the Connecticut Contract Exception, see notes 34 & 35 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Raven Indus. v. Lee, 783 N.W.2d 844, 848-49 (S.D. 2010) (confidentiality
covenants are protected by the Contract Exception; tort action for intentional interference with
the confidentiality covenant and tort action for unfair competition based on the same facts are not
preempted by the UTSA) (South Dakota enactment).
49. Hauck Mfg. Co. v. Astec Indus., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D. Tenn. 2004).
50. Id. at 659.
51. Id. The quoted language is from the UTSA definition of “improper means,” which is
incorporated into the UTSA definition of “misappropriation.” See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §
1(1)-(2), 14 U.L.A. 529, 537 (2005).
52. IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2002) (tort action for
intentional interference with a confidentiality covenant given by a customer to a supplier not
preempted).
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AN OVERVIEW OF RESTRICTIVE EMPLOYMENT
COVENANTS

A. General Principles
1. The Relationship of Restrictive Covenants to the
UTSA
In the absence of a restrictive covenant, a former employee is free
to compete with his or her former employer provided that the
competition does not involve unauthorized disclosure or unauthorized
use of the former employer’s protectable trade secrets.53 According to
the 2014 Restatement of Employment Law, a former employee also has
a continuing common-law duty of loyalty to a former employer to
protect the former employer’s trade secrets.54 In the jurisdictions that
have adopted the UTSA, a former employee likewise is subject to
liability under the Act for unauthorized disclosure or use of his or her
former employer’s trade secrets. When the UTSA is available as a
remedy for trade secret misappropriation, former employers typically
invoke it.
According to the Restatement of Employment Law, employers
sue former employees for breach of their common-law duty of loyalty
with respect to trade secrets primarily with respect to employment
contracts governed by Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina
law,55 the three states that have not enacted the UTSA.56 But, if, as a
commentator has asserted, the Restatement of Employment Law goes
beyond the reported cases in attributing a continuing duty of loyalty to
a former employee,57 former employers must rely primarily upon
restrictive employment covenants in transactions governed by the law
of these three states.
2. Common Restrictive Covenants
Restrictive employment covenants limit an employee’s freedom
to compete with his or her employer both before and after termination
of the employment relationship.58 Among the common restrictive
53. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2014).
54. See id. § 8.03(a).
55. See UNIF. LAW COMM’N, supra note 5.
56. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.03.
57. See Michael Selmi, The Restatement’s Supersized Duty of Loyalty Provision, 16 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 395, 406 (2012) (“There are . . . no cases cited that impose a duty of loyalty
after the employment relationship has ended; there are no cases relying on the duty of loyalty tort
to protect either confidential information or trade secrets.”).
58. Well-drafted restrictive employment covenants are obtained from current employees
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employment covenants are covenants not to compete, covenants not to
solicit business from customers of the employer, covenants not to
solicit employment of the employer’s employees, covenants not to
disclose or to use the trade secrets of the employer, and covenants not
to disclose or to use other confidential information of the employer.59
Covenants not to disclose trade secrets and other confidential
information sometimes are referred to as “nondisclosure agreements”
(NDAs) or “confidentiality agreements.”60
3. Limitations Upon the Enforceability of Restrictive
Covenants
Restrictive employment covenants are subject to general
limitations upon the enforceability of contracts, like the necessity of
bargained for consideration and the absence of a material breach of
contract by the employer seeking to enforce the covenant. The
enforceability of restrictive employment covenants also depends upon
their effect upon a restricted former employee’s ability to find
appropriate work.
There is no consideration problem with respect to covenants
entered into upon initial employment. Employment-at-will in exchange
for a covenant is sufficient consideration.61 But, in a significant number
and cover both their conduct while employed and their conduct after termination of employment.
See, e.g., Von Rohr Equip. Corp. v. Tanner Bolt & Nut Corp., No. 17-CV-2913 (NGG)(RER),
2017 WL 5184676 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2017) (Breach of contract claim dismissed without
prejudice; a poorly-drafted employer confidentiality and trade secret policy that referred
exclusively to “employee obligations” did not apply to a former employee.).
59. See, e.g., Bio Imaging Techs., Inc. v. Marchant, 584 F. Supp. 2d 322, 324-25 (D. Mass.
2008) (former employee had signed covenants not to compete, not to solicit former employer’s
customers, and not to disclose or to use confidential information); Amp, Inc. v. Fleischhacker,
823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987) (confidentiality covenant included trade secrets); Zep Mfg.
Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 662 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (one nondisclosure covenant
included trade secrets; whereas a second nondisclosure covenant excluded trade secrets); Loral
Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal App. 3d 268, 274, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836, 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (covenant
not to interfere with or to raid former employer’s employees). Covenants not to raid a former
employer’s employees address employee turnover in high-technology firms. See David L.
Simson, Customers, Co-Workers and Competition: Employee Covenants in California After
Edwards v. Arthur Anderson, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 239, 260 (2012).
60. See POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 3.04[3], supra note 40, at 3-42 (“[A]greements . . . that
are specifically directed to maintaining the secrecy of information . . . typically are called
nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements.”). Nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements are
the most common restrictive agreements between actual or potential business associates.
Almeling, Statistical Analysis Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 322 (“With third parties such as
suppliers or prospective suitors, the primary agreements are nondisclosure and confidentiality
agreements.”).
61. See, e.g., Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507, 511 (6th Cir. 1992) (“When, as
here, an employee begins work with the understanding that a covenant is a condition of
employment, the covenant is adequately supported by consideration even if it is not signed until
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of jurisdictions, a problem exists with respect to covenants agreed to
an appreciable time after an employee has begun work,62 including later
material modifications of covenants adopted at the beginning of
employment. Nevertheless, under the weight of authority, continuing
the employment of a prior at-will employee after he or she signs a
restrictive covenant is sufficient consideration for an otherwise
enforceable covenant.63
Another potential obstacle to enforcing a restrictive covenant is
employer misconduct. The Restatement of Employment Law gives the
following example:
Employee E signs a restrictive covenant as part of a two-year
employment agreement with employer X. The covenant states
that E will not compete with X for one year after the
termination of E’s employment. X materially breaches the
employment agreement by failing to pay E for several weeks,
and E therefore quits. Even if the non-competition covenant
were otherwise reasonable, X may not enforce it against E
because E’s quitting was in response to X’s material breach
of contract.64
Restrictive employment covenants constrain both competition
and a former employee’s ability to work and, for enforceability, require
justification by a protectable interest of the former employer.65
Covenants not to compete impose the greatest restrictions and require
the greatest justification.66 Four states—California , Louisiana, North
Dakota, and Oklahoma—restrict the enforceability of covenants not to
compete to narrow circumstances.67 Other states enforce covenants not
to compete that are reasonable in view of the former employer’s
protectable interests,68 which include protection of trade secrets,
later.”) (covenant signed 10 days after employee began work).
62. See, e.g., Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 1983) (covenant
not to compete signed some three years after employment began unenforceable due to lack of
consideration).
63. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.06 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2014). See, e.g.,
Computer Sales Int’l, Inc. v. Collins, 723 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (“A continuance
by employee in the employment of employer where he is under no obligation to remain and that
continuance by the employer of the employment where continuance is not required supplies
adequate consideration for a secondary contract.”).
64. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW, § 8.06 cmt. g, illus. 16.
65. See id. § 8.06.
66. See Sharon K. Sandeen & Elizabeth A. Rowe, Debating Employee Non-Competes and
Trade Secrets, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 438, 443 (2017) (“As a general rule, the more
an individual is prevented from pursuing his or her trade or professional calling, the more suspect
the agreement.”).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 442-43.

2018]

THE CONTRACT EXCEPTION TO THE UTSA

375

protection of customer relationships, protection of an investment in the
former employee’s reputation in the market,69 protection of the value
of a business purchased from the former employee,70 and protection of
other confidential information. In order to be reasonable, a covenant
not to compete must be “tailored in scope, geography, and time to
further a protectable interest” of the former employer.71
Covenants not to disclose or to use a former employer’s trade
secrets and other confidential information typically impose a lesser
burden upon competition and a former employee’s job opportunities
than a covenant not to compete and are more easily justified.72 The
Georgia, Illinois, and Tennessee enactments of the UTSA, for example,
contain a nonuniform amendment stating that a contractual duty to
maintain secrecy or to limit the use of a trade secret shall not be deemed
to be void or unenforceable solely for lack of a time or a geographical
limitation upon the duty.73 Some states require that covenants not to
69. For example, an employer can advertise the outstanding ability and professional
standing of specific named employees, which, in effect, shares the employer’s good will with the
named employees. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.07 cmt. d (justifying a reasonable covenant
not to compete).
70. See id. § 8.07(b).
71. See id. § 8.06.
72. A Texas Court of Appeals, for example, distinguished covenants not to compete and
nondisclosure covenants as follows:
Noncompete covenants are different than nondisclosure covenants. Noncompete
covenants restrain trade and are enforceable only if their terms are reasonable . . .
. Nondisclosure covenants, on the other hand, are not restraints of trade. They do
not necessarily restrict a former employee’s ability to compete with the former
employer. Nondisclosure covenants do not prohibit the former employee from
using, in competition with the former employer, the general knowledge, skill, and
experience acquired in the former employment.
Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 663 (Tex. App. 1992) (emphasis original).
73. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-767(b)(1) (2009 & 2016 Supp.); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
1065/8(b)(1) (2010 & 2017 Supp.); & TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1708(b)(1) (2013). The
Restatement of Unfair Competition likewise takes the position that nondisclosure agreements
lacking time and geographical limitations can be reasonable, RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 41 cmt. d (A M. LAW INST. 1995). According to the Restatement:
Once a secret is disclosed, knowledge of the information cannot normally be
confined to a particular area. Unauthorized disclosure in any area can therefore
result in harm to the trade secret owner. Similarly, unauthorized use in any area
may deprive the owner of potential licensing opportunities. Thus, although the
more onerous burden of a covenant not to compete is normally enforceable only if
confined within appropriate geographic limits, an absolute prohibition against the
use or disclosure of a trade secret is ordinarily justified . . . . The absence of an
express duration on a promise not to use or disclose a trade secret should also not
in itself render the agreement unenforceable since in the absence of a clear
intention to the contrary a nondisclosure agreement is ordinarily interpreted as
imposing an obligation of confidentiality only until the information becomes
generally known or readily ascertainable by proper means.
Id.
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disclose or to use trade secrets have scope, time, and geographical
limitations;74 whereas others do not.75 Covenants not to disclose, or to
use confidential information that is not a trade secret, are most likely
not to be required to have scope, time, and geographical limitations.76
B. The Dual Function of Covenants Not to Disclose or to Use
Information
Covenants not to disclose or to use without authorization the trade
secrets and other confidential information of a former employer have
at least two functions. Under the UTSA, requiring employees with
access to trade secrets to execute these covenants is evidence of the
reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy that is required to justify trade
secret rights.77 With respect to confidential information that is not a
trade secret, these covenants likewise are evidence of the reasonable
74. See, e.g., AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987)
(confidentiality covenant that was broad enough to cover trade secrets without time and
geographical limitations is unenforceable under Illinois law).
75. See, e.g., Synergetics, Inc. v. Hurst, 477 F.3d 949, 958-59 (8th Cir. 2007) (a
confidentiality covenant that was broad enough to cover trade secrets not shown to require time
and geographical limitations under Missouri law).
76. But see Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 663 (Tex. App. 1992) (One
nondisclosure covenant included trade secrets; the other was limited to confidential information
that was not a trade secret. Neither covenant required time, geographical, and scope-of-activity
limitations under Texas law).
77. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 529, 538 (2005) and accompanying
text; see, e.g., Avnet, Inc. v. Wyle Labs., Inc., 263 Ga. 615, 617, 437 S.E.2d 302, 304 (1993)
(“[T]here was, in the instant case, evidence from which the trial court could have found that Avnet
and Hall-Mark had made a reasonable effort to maintain the secrecy of the customer lists which
the trial court determined to be a “trade secret.” There was evidence that the customer lists were
not freely or widely disseminated and that certain employees to whom the information contained
in the lists had been disclosed were required to sign agreements to keep the information secret. It
is immaterial that some, but not all, employees were required to sign such agreements.”); see
generally Almeling, Statistical Analysis Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 322-23 (“The data show
that if the trade secret owner takes the following steps, a court is more likely to find that the owner
engaged in reasonable efforts: (1) agreements with employees; (2) agreements with business
partners; and (3) restricting access to certain persons[.]”). A companion analysis of state court
cases confirmed that confidentiality agreements with employees and with actual and prospective
business partners are the most important factors in the courts’ analysis of reasonable measures.
Almeling, Statistical Analysis State Courts, supra note 12, at 82-83. However, reasonable
measures can be proved without a restrictive employee covenant. See Peo Experts CA, Inc. v.
Engstrom, No. 2:17-cv-00318-KJM-CKD, 2017 WL 4181130, at 6-7, 11-12 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 21,
2017) (preliminary injunction against misappropriation issued against a former employee that had
not signed a restrictive employment covenant). If an employer requests that an employee sign a
restrictive employment covenant but the employee refuses, at a minimum the employer must
block the employee’s future access to trade secrets. See Art & Cook, Inc. v. Haber, No. 17-cv1634 (LDH) (CLP), 2017 WL 4443549 at 3-4 (E.D.N.Y Oct. 3, 2017) (motion for a DTSA
preliminary injunction denied due to lack of likelihood of success on the merits; the plaintiff failed
to bar access to trade secrets to employees who refused to sign a restrictive employment
covenant).
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efforts to maintain confidentiality that are necessary to enforce them.78
On the other hand, under the Contract Exception, covenants not to
disclose or to use without authorization the trade secrets and other
confidential information of a former employer justify injunctive relief
and the recovery of contract damages by the former employer.79
To the extent that a covenant not to disclose or to use information
protects trade secrets, the UTSA definition of “trade secret” is relevant
to the significance of the justification. However, to the extent that a
covenant not to disclose or to use confidential information protects
information that is not a trade secret, the UTSA definition of “trade
secret” is not relevant. Confidential information that is not a trade
secret can justify a reasonable restrictive covenant.80
But, a former employee’s signing of a confidentiality covenant
does not mean that the former employer has kept the relevant
information secret.81 A claim that a confidentiality covenant was
breached by unauthorized disclosure or use of confidential information

78. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Simplified Telesys, Inc. v. Live Oak Telecom, LLC, 68 S.W.3d 688, 692-93,
696 (Tex. App. 2002) (in former employer’s action for a preliminary and a permanent injunction
against breach of a confidentiality covenant that covered both proprietary information and trade
secrets, former employer presented more than a scintilla of evidence of breach; summary
judgment for former employees and the corporation that they had formed reversed). The contract
remedies available include both injunctive relief and damages. See, e.g., Lumex, Inc., v.
Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (former employer granted preliminary
injunction restraining employment of former employee by a competitor for six months; a factor
in the reasonableness of the restriction was that, if the former employee was unable to obtain other
employment during the six-month period, the former employer would pay his monthly base pay
at termination plus premiums for health and life insurance); see also Mattern & Assoc. v. Seidel,
678 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262, 266-68 (D. Del. 2010) (trial court upheld jury award of $150,000 in
stipulated damages for former employee’s breach of covenant not to compete).
80. See, e.g., Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1268-69 (8th Cir.
1978) (“The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that confidential business information which
does not rise to the level of a trade secret can be protected by a properly drawn covenant not to
compete.”); see also Johns-Manville Corp. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 586 F. Supp. 1034, 1074
(E.D. Mich. 1983), aff’d mem., 770 F.2d 178 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (contract forbidding disclosure of
secret or confidential information even if not patented or a trade secret enforceable under
Michigan law); Gary’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Worden, No. UWYCV095015363S, 2011 WL 383795
at *1 & *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2011) (contract to refrain from disclosing or using former
employer’s confidential information not preempted by the UTSA) (Connecticut enactment);
McKesson Medical-Surgical, Inc. v. Micro Bio Medics, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 590, 596-97 (E.D.
Mich. 2003) (“In this Court’s opinion, customer lists developed by the employee are not
protectable trade secrets . . . . If an employer wishes to restrict an employee’s use of such
information after the employment relationship is terminated, the employer must do it with an
appropriate noncompetition agreement.”) (Michigan enactment).
81. Rogerscasey, Inc. v. Nankof, No. 02 Civ. 2599(JSR), 2003 WL 1964049 at *5 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2003) (“The mere fact that the defendants signed confidentiality agreements
is insufficient to demonstrate that the identified client information was kept secret.”) (applying
California law).
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requires proof similar to proof of a trade secret claim.82 A
confidentiality covenant should be enforced only if the information
sought to be protected actually is confidential, reasonable efforts have
been made to keep it confidential,83 and the former employer has a
protectable interest in the information.84
C. The Effect of Restrictive Covenants in UTSA Litigation
The enforceable terms of a restrictive employment covenant can
limit the relief that is available under the UTSA. Restrictive
employment covenants, especially covenants not to compete and other
restrictive covenants that significantly limit a former employee’s job
opportunities, must contain reasonable limitations upon their scope,
duration, and geographical coverage. 85 If a restrictive employment
covenant permits disclosure of particular information to third parties,
disclosure or use of that information is not trade secret
misappropriation under the UTSA.86
The duration of a restrictive employment covenant also can
influence the duration of a UTSA injunction restraining trade secret
misappropriation.87 Furthermore, if an employment contract with one
82. See, e.g., SL Montevideo Tech., Inc. v. Eaton Aerospace, LLC, 491 F.3d 350, 354 (8th
Cir. 2007) (“A claim that a confidentiality agreement was breached by disclosure of a proprietary
combination of data should require the same precision of proof as a comparable trade secret
claim.”) (applying Minnesota law to an alleged breach of a confidentiality covenant by a customer
and affirming summary judgment for the defendant).
83. See, e.g., nClosures, Inc. v. Block & Co., 770 F.3d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[I]n order
to enforce the confidentiality agreement between nClosures and Block, we must find that
nClosures took reasonable steps to keep its proprietary information confidential.”) (applying
Illinois law and affirming summary judgment for the defendant); contra Loftness Specialized
Farm Equipment, Inc. v. Twiestmeyer, 742 F.3d 845, 850-52 (8th Cir. 2014) (trial court reversed
for granting summary judgment because plaintiff had not used reasonable efforts to keep
information confidential: “Instead of applying the test for the tort of misappropriation . . . , the
district court should have interpreted and applied the terms of the NDA.”) (Minnesota enactment).
84. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.07 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2014) (“Courts will
generally protect nonpublic commercial information that provides a clear economic advantage to
the employer by virtue of its confidentiality, provided that the restrictive covenant is otherwise
reasonable . . . and the information has been treated as confidential by the employer.”).
85. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW §8.06 cmt. e and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Morris Silverman Management Corp. v. Western Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 284
F. Supp. 2d 964, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“Where the parties have a contractual relationship that
defines the duty of nondisclosure, the contract defines that duty for purposes of misappropriation
under ITSA.”) (Illinois enactment).
87. See, e.g., Xantrex Tech. Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., No. 07-cv-02324-WYDMEH, 2008 WL 2185882 at *20, *22 (D. Colo. May 23, 2008) (“Xantrex seeks to enjoin Mr.
Thompson from working in his current capacity at AE as a Vice-President and General Manager
of Solar inverters for a period of one year. It seeks to start the clock on this period from the date
of entry of an order. I find this to be reasonable in light of the one-year period in his employment
agreement’s noncompetition clause.”) (Colorado enactment); see also La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar,
938 F. Supp. 523, 526, 528-29 & 531-32 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (covenant not to compete had one-
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or more restrictive employment covenants is replaced by a termination
agreement that includes a release of claims and an integration clause,
depending upon its wording, the termination agreement could preclude
both future claims under the restrictive covenant and future claims of
UTSA trade secret misappropriation.88
D. Suits for Both Breach of a Restrictive Covenant and
Violation of the UTSA
Former employers frequently sue former employees for both
breach of a restrictive employment covenant and violation of the
UTSA.89 In Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp.,90 the defendant, a former
supplier of the plaintiff, asserted that the trial court had erred in failing
to consolidate the two claims and in allowing the jury to find the
defendant liable upon both.91 The Washington Supreme Court
responded that the claims had different elements as demonstrated by
the Contract Exception and affirmed the trial court’s refusal to
consolidate.92 Nevertheless, if both claims are tried as in Boeing,
double recovery must not be allowed.
With respect to injunctive relief, there is no double recovery
problem, but the duration of a restrictive covenant can be considered to
limit the duration of injunctive relief for trade secret
misappropriation.93 With respect to monetary relief, the same item of
compensatory damages must not be recovered for both breach of
contract and trade secret misappropriation.94 Some states have an
year duration, court limited preliminary injunction under the UTSA to one year) (Minnesota
enactment).
88. Cf. Carboline Co. v. Lebeck, 990 F. Supp. 762, 765-66 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (release of
claims in termination agreement appeared to preclude future claims under restrictive employment
covenant).
89. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
90. Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 108 Wash. 2d 38, 738 P.2d 665 (1987) (en banc);
accord, Ed Nowogroski Ins., Inc. v. Rucker, 137 Wash. 2d 427, 437 n.2, 971 P.2d 936, 941 n.2
(1999) (en banc) (“The existence of a contract protecting trade secrets does not preclude a second
cause of action in tort under the provisions defining trade secrets.”) (Washington enactment);
contra Ins. Assoc. v. Hansen, 111 Idaho 206, 210, 723 P.2d 190, 194 (Idaho App. 1986)
(“Inasmuch as Insurance Associates is entitled to relief on its theory of breach of contract we need
not discuss whether Insurance Associates might also have any right to recover for breach of a
common-law duty or for violation of the Idaho Trade Secrets Act.”), appeal after remand aff’d
on other grounds, 116 Idaho 948, 782 P.2d 1230 (1989) (Idaho enactment).
91. Boeing Co., 108 Wash. 2d at 47-48, 738 P. 2d at 673-74.
92. Id. (“[A] contractual provision designed to protect against disclosure would…not be
subject to displacement by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”).
93. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
94. See Mattern & Assoc. v. Seidel, 678 F. Supp. 2d 256, 270 (D. Del. 2010) (the jury
found that the defendant former employee had both breached a covenant not to compete and
engaged in trade secret misappropriation but, in order to avoid double counting, awarded
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election of remedy doctrine intended to prevent double recovery95 that
comes into play. For example, before a final judgment is entered,
Virginia requires an election between a contract recovery and a tort
recovery for the same conduct,96 and North Carolina law does not allow
judgment on more than one legal theory for the same conduct.97
III.

FEDERAL TRADE SECRET LEGISLATION

A. The Economic Espionage Act
1. Overview
On October 11, 1996, President Clinton signed the Economic
Espionage Act (the EEA),98 the first significant federal statute
specifically criminalizing trade secret theft.99 The EEA is a
combination of two bills, one dealing with economic espionage
intended to benefit foreign governments, foreign instrumentalities, or
foreign agents,100 and the other dealing with trade secret theft affecting
interstate or foreign commerce.101 Both bills initially referred to
“proprietary economic information,”102 with a definition modeled upon
the UTSA definition of trade secret.103 The enacted statute applies to
both economic espionage involving “trade secrets” and theft of “trade
secrets.”104
Section 1831, the economic espionage provision, requires that an
actor either intend or know that the actor’s conduct “will benefit a
foreign government, a foreign instrumentality, or a foreign agent.”105
compensatory damages only for breach of the restrictive covenant).
95. See X Prod., L.L.C. v. Walter Kidde Portable Equip., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 494, 524
(E.D. Va. 2002) (“The doctrine is remedial in nature and does no more than prevent double
recovery.”).
96. Id.; see also id. at 523 (“It is well settled under Virginia Law that a plaintiff may not
recover in both Tort and Contract for the same conduct of the Defendant.”).
97. Id. at 523 (“Under North Carolina law, as under Virginia law, a plaintiff may not
recover on more than one theory for the same course of conduct.”).
98. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2012)
(amended 2016).
99. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 13.03, supra note 40, at 13-7.
100. S. 1557, 104th Cong. (1996) (proposing the Economic Security Act of 1996).
101. S. REP. NO. 104-359 (1996) (discussing S. 1556, 104th Cong. (1996) proposing the
Industrial Espionage Act of 1996).
102. Id. at 2 (discussing S. 1556). S. 1557 (the proposed Economic Security Act of 1996,
added “vital” to the phrase). S. 1557, 104th Cong. § 901(4) (1996) (definition of “vital proprietary
economic information”).
103. S. REP. NO. 104-359 at 16 (“This definition is closely modeled on the definition of a
‘trade secret’ in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”).
104. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a), 1832(a) (2012).
105. Id. § 1831(a).
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Section 1832, the trade secret theft provision, requires an intent to
convert a trade secret related to a product or service used in, or intended
for use in, interstate or foreign commerce to the economic benefit of a
person other than its owner either intending or knowing that the trade
secret owner will be injured.106
The penalties are severe. Violation of Section 1831, the economic
espionage provision, can subject an individual defendant to a fine of up
to $5,000,000 or 15 years imprisonment, or both,107 and an organization
defendant to a fine of the greater of $10,000,000 or three times the
value of the stolen trade secret to the organization, including costs
saved.108 Violation of Section 1832, the trade secret theft provision, can
subject an individual defendant to a maximum fine of two times the
gross gain from the offense, or two times the gross loss from the
offense, or $250,000, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for up to
10 years, or both fine and imprisonment.109 An organization defendant
can be fined the greater of $5,000,000 or three times the value of the
stolen trade secret to the organization, including costs saved.110
Attempts and conspiracies to violate both provisions have the
same penalties as full-blown violations.111 Moreover, a defendant can
be convicted of an attempt or a conspiracy based upon evidence that
the defendant believed that information was a trade secret. The United
States need not prove that a statutory trade secret actually existed.112 In
addition, the property involved in and derived from misappropriation
is subject to forfeiture,113 and a convicted defendant must pay
restitution to a victim.114
Both provisions share a definition of “trade secret” based on the
UTSA:

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. § 1831(b).
109. Id. § 1832(a) (since the EEA does not specify the maximum fine for individual
violators, the general felony maximum applies); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(e) (2012) (an individual can be
fined a maximum of either two times the gross gain or two times the gross loss caused by the
offense, or $250,000, whichever is larger) Id. § 3571(b)(2)-(3), (d).
110. Id. § 1832(b), amended by Defend Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. No. 114-153, §§ 1-7, 130
Stat. 376-86 (2016).
111. See id. §§ 1831(a)(4)-(5), 1832(a)(4)-(5).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 204 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[P]roof that the
defendants sought to steal actual trade secrets is not an element of the crimes of attempt or
conspiracy under the EEA.”); see also United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 630-31 (E.D. Pa.
1999) (denying a motion to dismiss an EEA indictment due to the vagueness of the EEA definition
of trade secret because the defendant was charged only with attempt and conspiracy).
113. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1834, 2323(a)(1) (2012).
114. Id. §§ 1834, 2323(c), 3663A(a)(1).
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all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical,
economic, or engineering information, including patterns,
plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs,
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures,
programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and
whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically,
electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing
if—
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep
such information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to,
and not being readily ascertainable through proper means
by, another person who can obtain economic value from
the disclosure or use of the information.115
The EEA’s illustrative list116 of the forms and types of information
that can be a trade secret is more elaborate than the UTSA’s illustrative

115. Id. § 1839(3), amended by Defend Trade Secrets Act; H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 12
(1996) (“The definition of the term ‘trade secret’ is based largely on the definition of that term in
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”). As intended, the 2016 amendment brought the EEA definition
into greater conformity with the UTSA, which refers to trade secrets as information not generally
known to, and not readily ascertainable by proper means by, “persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use.” UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 529, 538 (2005).
Both the Senate and the House Judiciary Committee Reports on the DTSA state:
The intent of Section 2(b)(1)(A)—striking “the public” and inserting “another
person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the
information”—is to bring the Federal definition of a trade secret in conformity
with the definition used in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”).
S. REP. NO, 114-220, at 10 (2016); H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 13 (2016).
Prior to the amendment, the test for secrecy was whether information was readily known to or
readily ascertainable by “the public.” 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). The federal courts discussed in dicta
whether this was a marked departure from the Uniform Act but never definitively resolved the
issue. In United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 2002), for example, Judge Easterbrook
commented:
A problem with using the general public as the reference group for identifying a
trade secret is that many things unknown to the public at large are well known to
engineers, scientists, and others whose intellectual property the Economic
Espionage Act was enacted to protect . . . . Section 1839(3)(B) replaces “persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use” with “the public.” The
prosecutor believes that the substitution supports the conclusion that Congress
referred to the general public. Yet one could say instead that “the public” is shorthand for the longer phrase, which then would be read as “the economically relevant
public”—that is, the persons whose ignorance of the information is the source of
its economic value.
Id. at 267 (dicta) (emphasis original).
116. H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 12 (1996) (“These general categories of information are
included in the definition of trade secret for illustrative purposes and should not be read to limit
the definition of trade secret. It is the Committee’s intent that this definition be read broadly.”).
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list, but that is not a substantive difference.117 Nor is the EEA’s express
reference to “intangible” trade secrets and “whether or how”
memorialized a departure from the UTSA. Deliberately memorizing a
trade secret that has not been memorialized physically is actionable
under the UTSA.118 For example, in Ed Nowogroski Insurance, Inc. v.
Rucker,119 a Supreme Court of Washington en banc decision, the Court
stated:
The form of information, whether written or memorized, is
immaterial under the…Uniform Trade Secrets Act [which]
makes no distinction about the form of trade secrets. Whether
the information is on a CD, a blueprint, a film, a recording, a
hard paper copy or memorized by the employee, the inquiry
is whether it meets the definition of trade secret under the Act
and whether it was misappropriated.120
2. The Need for the DTSA
Notwithstanding its expansive language and severe criminal
penalties, the EEA is sparingly used by the U.S. Justice Department. A
2012 analysis of enforcement actions reported approximately 124
prosecutions in the sixteen years since enactment—an average of less
than eight a year.121 Prosecutions had occurred in less than 45% of
federal judicial districts.122 Less than 10% of the prosecutions involved
economic espionage, and more than 90% involved trade secret theft.123
However, a significant number of potential economic espionage cases
117. James H.A. Pooley, Mark A. Lemley & Peter J. Toren, Understanding the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 189 (1997) (“Because of the expansive
interpretation already given to the UTSA definition, the EEA will probably apply to the same
types of information[.]”); see also POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 40, at 2-47
([Notwithstanding the differences in the definitions, they represent] “no real difference, since the
examples from each can all be read into the other.”).
118. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.02 Reporters’ Notes to cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2014)
(“[M]ore than 40 states have adopted the UTSA in a substantially similar form and the majority
position is that memorized information can be the basis for a trade-secret claim.”).
119. Ed Nowogroski Ins., Inc. v. Rucker, 137 Wash. 2d 427, 971 P.2d 936 (1999) (en banc)
(Washington enactment).
120. Id. at 449-50, 971 P.2d at 948; accord Al Minor & Assoc. v. Martin, 117 Ohio St.3d
58, 64, 881 N.E.2d 850, 855 (2008) (“[I]nformation …is protected by the UTSA, regardless of
the manner, mode, or form in which it is stored—whether on paper, in a computer, in one’s
memory, or in any other medium.”) (Ohio enactment); see also Stampede Tool Warehouse, Inc.
v. May, 272 Ill. App. 3d 580, 590, 651 N.E.2d 209, 217 (1st. Dist.), appeal denied, 163 Ill.2d 589,
657 N.E.2d 639 (1995) (“[M]emorization is one method of misappropriation.”) (Illinois
enactment).
121. Peter J. Toren, An Analysis of Economic Espionage Act Prosecutions, 84 BNA PAT.,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 884, 885 (2012).
122. Id. at 886.
123. Id. at 886-87.
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were prosecuted as trade secret theft cases, which were easier to
prove.124
The sparse number of annual prosecutions suggested that the EEA
had not been a major deterrent to trade secret theft.125 This, plus
testimony that serious trade secret misappropriation was occurring126
resulted in Congressional enactment of the DTSA, which President
Obama signed on May 11, 2016.127 The new federal statute amended
the EEA, most importantly128 by adding a federal private civil
remedy,129 and by changing the EEA definition of trade secret.130
B. The Defend Trade Secrets Act
1. Overview
The centerpiece of the DTSA is the creation of a federal private
civil action for trade secret misappropriation involving a product or a
service related to interstate or foreign commerce:
An owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may bring
a civil action under this subsection if the trade secret is related
124. Id. at 887.
125. Id. at 886 (“[E]nhancing the certainty of punishment produces a stronger deterrent
effect than enhancing the severity of the punishment.”).
126. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 114-529, at 3 (2016) (“Trade secrets are an integral part of a
company’s competitive advantage in today’s economy, and with the increased digitization of
critical data and increased global trade, this information is highly susceptible to theft . . . . General
Keith Alexander, former head of the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command,
estimated that U.S. companies lose $250 billion per year due to the theft of their intellectual
property.”).
127. Defend Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. No. 114-153, §§ 1-7, 130 Stat. 376-86 (2006).
128. The DTSA also includes provisions: (1) increasing the maximum fine for an
organization engaged in criminal trade secret theft; (2) adding criminal economic espionage and
criminal trade secret theft to the predicate acts for RICO violations; (3) requiring the U.S. Attorney
General to report to the U.S. House and Senate Judiciary Committees and to make public not later
than one year after the date of enactment and biannually thereafter recommendations with respect
to the theft of trade secrets from U.S. companies outside the U.S., including the protections
afforded by U.S. trading partners and progress with respect to trade agreements and treaties
dealing with the problem; and (4) requiring the Federal Judicial Center to recommend to the U.S.
House and Senate Judiciary Committees not later than two years after the date of enactment and
thereafter from time to time best practices for the seizure, securing, and storing of information.
Id. §§ 3-4, 6-7, 130 Stat. 382-86.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2012). The existence of this new federal civil remedy may result
in even fewer EEA criminal prosecutions. U.S. Attorney prosecution guidelines disfavor
prosecuting cases in which the victim has a meaningful civil remedy. Toren, supra note 121, at
886.
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(B) (amended 2016). This amendment conformed the EEA
definition of trade secret with the UTSA definition by requiring that a trade secret derive economic
value from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
persons who can derive economic value from its disclosure or use. See supra note 115 and
accompanying text.
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to a product or service used in, or intended for use in,
interstate or foreign commerce.131
Most of the federal private remedies for trade secret
misappropriation are derived from the UTSA.132 However, in
extraordinary circumstances, the DTSA also authorizes ex parte
application for court-ordered seizure of property in order to prevent the
propagation or dissemination of a trade secret.133 Among the statutory
safeguards against abuse of this extraordinary remedy134 are the
requirement of an affidavit or a verified complaint and judicial findings
that it clearly appears from specific facts that: (1) equitable relief is
inadequate because the party against whom seizure is ordered would
evade, avoid, or otherwise not comply; (2) immediate and irreparable
injury will occur if seizure is not ordered; (3) the harm to the applicant
from denying the application will outweigh the harm to the legitimate
interests of the person against whom seizure is ordered and
substantially outweigh the harm to third parties; (4) the applicant is
likely to succeed in showing that the information at issue is a trade
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1). The phrasing of the interstate or foreign commerce nexus for
federal court jurisdiction is identical to that in the EEA criminal trade secret theft provision. See
supra note 109 and accompanying text; S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 5 (2016); H.R. REP. NO. 114-529,
at 9 (2016) (“This jurisdictional nexus to interstate or foreign commerce is identical to the existing
language required for Federal jurisdiction over the criminal theft of a trade secret under
§1832(a).”).
132. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3) (regarding injunctive relief, damages, and, in the event of
willful and malicious misappropriation, exemplary damages, plus, in the court’s discretion, a
successful plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees. Reasonable attorney’s fees also can be awarded
if a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith or a motion to terminate an injunction is either
made or opposed in bad faith). The injunctive and damage provisions are “drawn directly” from
the UTSA, and the exemplary damage and attorney’s fee provisions are “similar to” and “modeled
on” the UTSA. S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 8-9 (2016); H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 12-13 (2016).
A special limitation, which is intended to protect employee mobility, states that the terms of an
injunction shall not:
(I)
prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship, and
that conditions placed on such employment shall be based on evidence
of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information that
the person knows; or
(II)
otherwise conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on
the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business.
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i).
133. Id. § 1836(b)(2).
134. In commenting upon the version of the ex parte seizure provision that appeared in the
2015 bill proposing the DTSA, Professor Eric Goldman concluded:
Given the unique attributes of trade secrets that make plaintiffs’ self-serving
statements impossible for judges to evaluate independently, additional procedural
mechanisms are not enough to reduce the risk of errors . . . . [I]t would make sense
to strip the Seizure Provision from the Act.
Eric Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
ONLINE 284, 307 (2015), http://bit.do/DTSA_Goldman.
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secret that the person against whom seizure is ordered either
misappropriated by improper means or conspired to use improper
means to misappropriate; (5) the person against whom seizure is
ordered has actual possession of the trade secret and the other property
to be seized; (6) the application describes with reasonable particularity
the matter to be seized, and, to the extent reasonable, its location; (7) if
prior notice were given, the person against whom seizure is ordered or
confederates will destroy, move, hide, or otherwise make inaccessible
the property to be seized; and (8) the applicant has not publicized the
requested seizure,135 as publication could signify improper motivation.
The court can require the applicant to provide adequate security for
resulting liability.136
A hearing upon the propriety of an ex parte seizure at which the
applicant has the burden of proof ordinarily is held no later than seven
days after the order is issued,137 and a person harmed by the order can
move for its dissolution or modification at any time.138 Damage liability
is imposed for wrongful or excessive seizure.139 All seized material is
in the custody of the court.140 Two commentators summed up the first
year of experience with the DTSA seizure provision as follows:
The very few cases in which seizure was granted demonstrate
that a finding of extraordinary circumstances will likely be
limited to cases in which, for instance, a plaintiff can prove
that a defendant is likely to violate a court order for
preservation of materials.141

135. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A).
136. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(vi). The amount of security required does not limit the damages
recoverable for wrongful or excessive seizure. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(G).
137. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(v), (F)(i).
138. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(F)(iii).
139. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(G).
140. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(D)(i).
141. JOHN M. CALLAGY & DAMON W. SUDEN, Torts of Competition, § 121:9.50, in
BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS (Robert L. Haig ed., 4th ed.,
2017).
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Another innovation is the DTSA “whistle blower” provisions.142
Section 1833143 creates civil and criminal immunity under both federal
and state law for confidentially disclosing a trade secret to a federal,
state, or local governmental official or to an attorney solely for the
purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law144 or
in a document filed under seal in a lawsuit or another proceeding,145
including a lawsuit challenging retaliation by an employer for reporting
a suspected violation of law.146
The whistleblower immunity provisions are the only aspect of the
DTSA that preempts state law.147 Furthermore, employers are required
to give notice of the immunity in either a contract with an employee
that governs the use of a trade secret or by a cross reference to another
document provided to the employee dealing with the employer’s policy
with respect to reporting suspected violations of law.148 Employers
cannot recover either punitive damages or attorney’s fees in a DTSA

142. See Jessica Engler, The Defend Trade Secrets Act at Year One, IN-HOUSE DEFENSE Q.
20, 23 (2017) (the DTSA has whistleblower immunity provisions). The whistleblower provisions
are based on a prior version of Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade
Secret Protection, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2017).
Immunity extends beyond employee revelations during investigations of their employers. Unless
narrowed by the courts, an Apple employee could be immunized from liability for disclosing trade
secrets to the FBI in a criminal investigation of a third party; for example, for disclosing how to
unlock an Apple watch owned by a bank robber, see Jordan J. Altman et al., License to Leak: The
DTSA and the Risks of Immunity, 28 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 6, 7 (2016) (“[I]t does not restrict
immunity to those disclosures of trade secrets made within the context of an investigation of the
trade secret owner.”).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1833 (amended 2016).
144. Id. § 1833(b)(1)(A). In Unum Group v. Loftus, 220 F. Supp. 3d 143 (D. Mass. 2016),
a federal district judge denied a former employee’s motion to dismiss federal and state claims for
trade secret misappropriation based upon the whistleblower defense. The judge considered that
there were insufficient record facts to support the defense:
There has been no discovery to determine the significance of the documents taken
or their contents, and Loftus has not filed any potential lawsuit that could be
supported by the information in those documents. Further, it is not ascertainable
from the complaint whether Loftus turned over all of Unum’s documents to his
attorney, which documents he took and what information they contained, or
whether he used, is using, or plans to use, those documents for any purpose other
than investigating a potential violation of law.
Id. at 147.
145. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(B).
146. Id. § 1833(b)(2). There is no immunity if an employee gained unauthorized access to a
trade secret or other confidential information through an act prohibited by law. Id. § 1833(b)(5).
147. Id. § 1838 (“except” clause). Since the whistleblower immunity provisions preempt
conflicting state law, a plaintiff cannot avoid them by suing under the UTSA rather than the
DTSA.
148. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(A)-(B). The notice requirement applies only to contracts governing
use of trade secrets or confidential information either entered into or updated after May 11, 2016
the effective date of the DTSA. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(D).
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action against an employee who was not given sufficient notice.149 The
“employees” entitled to notice of whistleblower immunity include
contractors or consultants.150
The DTSA defines “misappropriation” for purposes of the federal
private civil action in accord with the UTSA.151 The broader EEA tests
for criminal economic espionage and criminal trade secret theft are not
used.152
The new federal private civil action for trade secret
misappropriation generally does not preempt state law, including the
UTSA.153 Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction of actions
under the federal statute,154 and state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction.155 Federal and state court cases can include claims under
both the federal statute and a state enactment of the UTSA.156 However,
suing under the federal statute alone does not permit a plaintiff to assert
noncontractual state legal claims preempted by state enactment of the

149. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(C).
150. Id. § 1833(b)(4).
151. Id. § 1839(5). Both the Senate and House Judiciary Committee Reports on the Act
contain the following statement:
[M]isappropriation is defined identically in all relevant respects to the definition
of misappropriation in § 1(2) of the UTSA. The Committee intentionally used this
established definition to make clear that this Act is not intended to alter the balance
of current trade secret law or alter specific court decisions.
S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 10 (2016); H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 14 (2016).
152. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(1)-(3), 1832(a)(1)-(3). These EEA definitions of wrongful
conduct are broader than UTSA misappropriation. See Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goose:
The Dangers of Strengthening Domestic Trade Secret Rights in Response to
Cybermisappropriation, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172, 227 (2014) (“[T]he EEA’s version of
misappropriation criminalizes many forms of conduct that would be deemed fair competition and
therefore lawful under the UTSA.”).
153. Defend Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2(f), 130 Stat. 382 (2016) (providing
that the federal private civil action amendments do not alter 18 U.S.C. § 1838, which states that
the EEA does not preempt state civil remedies); id. § 7(b), 130 Stat. at 385-86 (preempting state
law inconsistent with the DTSA whistleblower immunity provisions, is the sole exception).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(c) (federal district courts have original jurisdiction of civil actions
under the DTSA).
155. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) (“[I]f exclusive [federal court]
jurisdiction be neither express nor implied, the State courts have concurrent jurisdiction [of federal
claims] whenever, by their own constitution, they are competent to take it.”); see also Tafflin v.
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-460 (1990) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO
claims). However, a defendant sued in state court under the DTSA can remove the action to
federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(b) (2012).
156. As of September 27, 2016, most of the initial DTSA cases were filed in federal court
but relief seemed primarily to be sought for a companion claim under a state enactment of the
UTSA, Scott Graham, Errant Email Leads to Conn. Trade Secrets Suit, LAW.COM (Sept. 27,
2016), http://bit.do/errant-email-suit (“Like most DTSA cases we’ve seen so far, it’s going to be
decided under the forum state’s version of the law.”).
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UTSA.157 The preemptive effect of the UTSA upon the other law of an
enacting state is not dependent upon the assertion of a UTSA claim.158
The legislative history of the DTSA is replete with assertions that
the statute would increase the uniformity of American trade secret
law.159 Because the federal definitions of both trade secret and
misappropriation are consistent with the UTSA,160 this will occur only
if federal and state courts look to well-reasoned decisions under the
UTSA to construe the federal statute.161
The legislative history indicates that this is what Congress
intended. In addition to proposing legislation that tracked the UTSA
definitions of trade secret and misappropriation,162 both the Senate and
House Judiciary Committees issued reports stating that there was no
intention to alter the result of court decisions under the UTSA:
157. The Official Text of the UTSA preempts duplicative tort, restitutionary, and other
noncontractual law of an enacting state that provides a civil remedy for misappropriation of a
trade secret. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(a), 14 U.L.A. 529, 651 (2005). Alabama, Iowa,
Nebraska, and New Mexico have omitted the UTSA preemption clause and there is split of
judicial authority as to its scope in enacting states. The majority view preempts noncontractual
legal claims protecting business information, whether or not the business information satisfies the
UTSA definition of trade secret; whereas the minority view preempts noncontractual legal claims
protecting business information only if the business information satisfies the UTSA definition of
trade secret. See generally Dole, Preemption, supra note 2, at 108-10. The minority view can run
afoul of federal patent preemption. See generally Charles Tait Graves & Elizabeth Tippett, UTSA
Preemption and The Public Domain: How Courts Have Overlooked Patent Preemption of State
Law Claims Alleging Employee Wrongdoing, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 59 (2012). Federal copyright
preemption also limits application of the minority view. See id. at 64 n.4.
158. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(a); PHA Lighting Design, Inc. v. Kosheluk, No.
1:08-cv-01208-JOF, 2010 WL 1328754 at *10-*11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2010) (preempting unjust
enrichment and conversion claims even though there was no claim of trade secret
misappropriation) (Georgia enactment).
159. See, e.g., 162 CONG. REC. S1630 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (“Our Defend Trade Secrets
Act creates a single national baseline, or a minimal level of protection, and gives trade secret
owners access to both a uniform national law and to the reach of the Federal courts[.]”) (remarks
of Sen. Coons); 162 CONG. REC. H2032 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016) (“S. 1890 would provide trade
secrets owners access to uniform national law and the ability to make their case in Federal court.”)
(remarks of Rep. Conyers).
160. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
161. See David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 796 (2009) (“One could argue that an FTSA
[federal trade secret act] would, upon passage, create a vacuum in which there would be no
precedent to apply . . . . An FTSA will . . . not create a complete vacuum, as courts will be able to
incorporate and use UTSA-based precedent.”). One commentator has observed that, even with
the aid of UTSA precedent, “the DTSA will create uncertainty for decades.” Sharon K. Sandeen,
The DTSA: The Litigator’s Full-Employment Act, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 308, 320
(2015).
162. The intent is to bring the federal definition of a trade secret in conformity with the
definition in the UTSA. “[M]isappropriation” is defined identically in all relevant respects to the
definition of misappropriation in § 1(2) of the UTSA, S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 10 (2016); H.R.
REP. NO. 114-529, at 13-14 (2016).
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While . . . minor differences between the UTSA and the
Federal definition of a trade secret remain, the Committee
does not intend for the definition of a trade secret to be
meaningfully different from the scope of that definition as
understood by courts in States that have adopted the UTSA .
. . . “[M]isappropriation” is defined identically in all relevant
respects to the definition of misappropriation in § 1(2) of the
UTSA. The Committee intentionally used this established
definition to make clear that this Act is not intended to alter
the balance of current trade secret law or alter specific court
decisions.163
2. The DTSA Equivalent of the UTSA Contract
Exception
The DTSA has no counterpart of UTSA Section 7(a), which
preempts duplicative enacting state tort, restitutionary, and other civil
remedies for trade secret misappropriation.164 However, there is a
DTSA counterpart of the UTSA Section 7(b) Contract Exception.165
DTSA Section 1838 essentially creates a general presumption of
nonpreemption and nondisplacement:
Except as provided in section 1833(b),166 this chapter shall not
be construed to preempt or displace any other remedies,
whether civil or criminal, provided by United States Federal,
State, commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the
misappropriation of a trade secret or to affect the otherwise
lawful disclosure of information by any Government
employee under… the Freedom of Information Act.167
Another DTSA provision subordinates the injunctive provisions
of the federal private action to state limitations upon restrictive
employment covenants. Section 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II) provides:
163.
164.

S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 14.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(a), 14 U.L.A 529, 651 (2005); POOLEY, TRADE
SECRETS, supra note 40, at 2-49 (“One significant difference between the UTSA and DTSA is the
statute’s effect on other laws or claims . . . . [T]he DTSA is expressly non-preemptive[.]”).
165. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) creates whistleblower immunity from liability under federal and
state law; see supra notes 143-151 and accompanying text.
167. Id. § 1838. This EEA provision was reaffirmed by the DTSA. See Defend Trade Secrets
Act, Pub. L. No. 114-153 § 2(f), 130 Stat. 382 (2016) (“Nothing in the amendments made by this
section shall be construed to modify the rule of construction under section 1838 of Title 18 . . . or
to preempt any other provision of law.”). Section 1838 also assures that state UTSA enactments
are not preempted by the DTSA. See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 10 (2016); H.R. REP. NO. 114-529,
at 14 (2016) (“Subsection 2(f) of the Act clarifies that nothing in this Act modifies the rule of
construction in § 1838 of title 18, and, as a result State trade secret laws are not preempted or
affected by this Act.”).
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In a civil action brought under this subsection with respect to
misappropriation of a trade secret, a court may
(A) grant an injunction . . . provided the order does not . . .
(II) . . . conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting
restraints . . . on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or
business.168
In other words, state regulation of restrictive employment covenants
was called to the attention of Congress during the consideration of the
DTSA. Congress was advised that this state law would be protected
from change by Section 1838, the federal equivalent of the UTSA
Contract Exception.
The DTSA follows the UTSA in making the existence of a trade
secret a prerequisite to misappropriation and entitlement to a
remedy.169 The definitions of “trade secret” and “misappropriation” are
as central to the federal private action as they are to the UTSA, and
likewise should be immune from contractual variation.170
The DTSA is as accommodating of restrictive employment
covenants as the UTSA Contract Exception.171 The special DTSA bar
upon injunctive relief that is inconsistent with state law prohibiting
certain restrictive employment covenants goes further and defers to
state preferences.172 In Engility Corp. v. Daniels,173 a federal district
judge interpreted this deference to mean that a DTSA injunction could
not impose a restriction on competition that would be invalid in a
restrictive covenant under the applicable state law.174 Because the
district judge considered that a limited restriction upon competition
would pass muster under state law, he directed the parties to brief what
scope, temporal, and geographic limitations should be imposed.175 The
168. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(ll). California Senator Feinstein proposed this provision
and others to ensure that the DTSA would not override California’s limited acceptance of
covenants not to compete. See CONG. REC. S1636-37 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (remarks of Sen.
Feinstein).
169. See 18 U.S.C § 1839(5) (misappropriation is wrongful “acquisition,” “disclosure,” or
“use” of a “trade secret”); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (misappropriation is
wrongful “acquisition,” “disclosure,” or “use” of a “trade secret”). The DTSA definition is
identical “in all relevant respects” to the UTSA definition. S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 10 (2016);
H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 14 (2016).
170. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
173. Engility Corp. v. Daniels, No. 16-cv-2473-WJM-MEH, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166737
(D. Colo. Dec. 2, 2016).
174. Id. at *31 (“[T]he Court cannot issue an injunction that effectively creates a statutorily
disapproved noncompete restriction.”).
175. Id. at *39.
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issued preliminary injunction enjoined the defendants from directly or
indirectly soliciting, accepting, and performing any support work for
specified types of contracts with the United States Northern Command
for one year. 176 In dictum, the judge observed that it would be
incongruous if an injunction under the applicable state enactment of
UTSA was not also subject to the limitations imposed by the enacting
state’s restrictive covenant policy.177
CONCLUSION
Both the UTSA, through the Contract Exception, and the DTSA,
through its general presumption of nonpreemption and
nondisplacement, accommodate enforceable restrictive employment
covenants. Both statutes also permit tort actions for intentional
interference with enforceable restrictive covenants. But the definitions
of “trade secret” and “misappropriation” are so central to the statutes
that contractual variations should be unenforceable. 178 Neither statute
should apply to confidential information that does not qualify as a trade
secret but can be protected by enforceable restrictive covenants.179
As is the case under the UTSA, the terms of restrictive
employment covenants to which a former employee has agreed can
affect the relief available against the former employee under the
DTSA.180 If a former employer sues a former employee for damages
under both a restrictive employment covenant and the DTSA, double
recovery likewise must be avoided.181 Furthermore, the DTSA’s
express subordination to state restrictive covenant policy should lead
to recognition of a similar subordination under the UTSA.

176. Id. at *43.
177. Id. at *32 (“[W]ith respect to [the Colorado Uniform Trade Secrets Act], it would be
incongruous if the Court could create, by judicial fiat, a noncompete restriction that would not
survive [the state enactment] if it appeared in a contract.”).
178. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.

